Introduction
According to standard economic policy, discretionary fiscal policy should be countercyclical.
In the neoclassical smoothing model of Barro (1979) , a government should optimally run surpluses in good times and deficits in bad times. That is the same a government should do, though for different reasons, in the standard Keynesian or neo-Keynesian framework. But the common ownership of public resources, 1 principal-agent problems, 2 time-inconsistency problems -i.e. the incentives not to adhere ex post to ex ante announcements -and political budget cycles 3 create a bias towards fiscal deficits, leading to public expenditure distortions and procyclicality (pressures to overspend, in particular in good times).
There is a wealth of evidence on the procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America This procyclical nature of fiscal policy in Latin America has been exacerbated by: i) the relative scarcity, uncertainty and high volatility of revenues (with the exception of Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina) as commodity-linked revenues (taxes, royalties, profits) can be a large portion of government revenue; ii) the pervasive rigidities in public expenditures (which have led to a concentration of fiscal adjustments in public investments); iii) the need for ensuring progress to reduce poverty and inequality, which are very high in the region; iv) the exposure of some countries in the region to pronounced economic fluctuations -shocks from sharp changes in the terms of trade as they are rich in commodities, price-takers and small, open economies -and to procyclical capital flows; and, v) in bad times (sudden stops and/or negative trade-related shocks), governments in emerging markets are credit-constrained while when times improve they are free to go on a debt-financed spending spree (see Alberola and Montero, 2006) . Thus, avoidance of procyclicality and debt sustainability in the region requires first and foremost the creation of adequate "fiscal space" (saving revenue windfalls in good times) to prevent the emergence of such financing constraints in bad times, or to prevent the rapid changes in investor sentiment and ease the vulnerability to financial crises, especially given the small size of automatic stabilisers (stemming mainly from the limited tax bases due to informality, and the absence of generalised unemployment protection schemes). Numerical fiscal rules have emerged as the response to create the "fiscal space" in Latin America and to provide a credible medium-term anchor for public finances.
Extensive empirical literature suggests that market discipline is certainly not a sufficient deterrent against deficit biases and/or fiscal procyclicality: if anything, the market seems to penalise fiscal profligacy in a discontinuous fashion only at a late stage. So, over the past two decades an increasing number of countries around the world have steadily adopted
1. The common pool problem is the fact that recipients of public spending fail to fully internalise the costs that taxpayers must assume (Debrun and Kumar, 2007) . For example, in a monetary union among sovereign nations or among subnational entities, there may be adverse externalities created by the loose fiscal behaviour of one member of the union for other members. This free rider behaviour of lower-level governments assumes that the central government and other lower-level governments will adopt a compensatory policy course, or that the central government will bail out subnational governments as they run into financial trouble.
2. The principal-agent problems arise between voters and political authorities due to lack of representation of future generations, sensitivity to special-interest lobbies, corruption and use of asymmetric and biased information. 3. Politicians are inclined to use public spending to advance their re-election prospects whenever an election approaches (Rogoff, 1990) . See Nieto-Parra and Santiso (2010) for the analysis of political budget cycles in Latin American countries.
fiscal rules to tackle the above-mentioned problems. 4, 5 Broadly following Kopits and Symansky (1998) , a fiscal rule is defined as a long-lasting constraint on fiscal policy through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates (defined as standing commitments to specified numerical targets for some key budget and/or debt aggregates and to some procedures).
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This rules-based framework is an application of the more general "rules rather than discretion" principle developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) in monetary policy (inflation bias is the result of discretion, but rules have a cost because they cannot include all possible contingencies and hence do not allow for an optimal response to unforeseen circumstances). In monetary policy the tension was motivated by the 1970s "Great Inflation", was intellectually grounded in the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics and was solved by delegating the task of conducting policy to an independent agency (the central bank) that can act with discretion but does not suffer from inflation bias, because it is either more conservative than society as a whole (Rogoff, 1985) or has incentive contracts (Walsh, 1995) .
In contrast to monetary policy rules and institutions, fiscal rules and institutions have received less attention from policymakers and academic researchers alike. Fiscal policy discretion may be beneficial under a number of circumstances (e.g. in the presence of unexpected shocks that require speedy policy action or virtuous politicians, especially in Latin
American countries where the unexpected shocks are large and lack large automatic stabilisers). But as explained before, there is growing evidence that discretion can be misused, leading to deficit bias, or the implementation of procyclical fiscal policies. In addition, matters are more complicated in fiscal policy than in monetary policy because budget decisions are at the centre of the political process and hence cannot be delegated to a politically unaccountable agency, which could expand the efficiency frontier in the trade-off between flexibility and credibility (fiscal councils, unlike central banks in monetary policy, are simply watchdogs that provide independent assessment of fiscal policy). Kopits (2001) argues that having a set of permanent, well-designed and properly implemented fiscal rules establishes a more depoliticised framework for fiscal policy. In any case, although the ideal would be to adopt rules that allow for the highest credibility while limiting reduction in flexibility, they are bound to prevent an appropriate fiscal response in at least some circumstances.
This survey focuses on a group of seven countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), bringing their fiscal rules under scrutiny. 7 It explores a range of design features (the specific numerical target laid down by the rule, which can be expressed either as a percentage of GDP, in local currency units or a growth rate, and the period over which the rule is to be applied), statutory provisions (constitutional provisions, high-level legislation, ordinary legislation that applies to governments over successive electoral cycles or merely a policy guideline), the penalties for non-compliance (institutional or personal sanctions), institutional coverage (the level of government to which they apply) and operational arrangements (whether the rules include "escape clauses" -flexibility in special circumstances 4. According to Schaechter et al. (2012) , in 1990 only five countries had fiscal rules in place whereas by end-March 2012 the number of countries with national and/or supranational fiscal rules surged to 76. Advanced economies were the frontrunners, but about a decade later rules were also adopted in a number of emerging economies. 5. For Spain's case see, for example, the article "The reform of the fiscal framework in Spain: constitutional limits and the new public spending growth rule", published in the October 2011 edition of the Banco de España's Economic Bulletin. 6. Fiscal rules can also serve other objectives: to contain the size of government and to support inter-generational equity. 7. In five of these countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) fiscal policy rules have been embedded in an inflation targeting regime.
such as natural disasters and severe recessions -). Table 1 presents a summary of these key components of their fiscal rules. After this introduction, Section 2 analyses the different forms of fiscal rules from a theoretical point of view. Section 3 describes the individual country experiences with fiscal rules. Section 4 presents a general assessment of the fiscal rules in the region and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Types of fiscal rules
Although fiscal rules have in common as its main objective to promote consistency with the intertemporal budget constraint, they take varied forms depending on the emphasis on long term sustainability (reduce the deficit bias and control the growth in public debt) or in reducing procyclicality of fiscal policy (short term stabilisation). 8 The first type of rules (those mainly based on signaling a commitment to fiscal sustainability) are based on numerical targets imposed on: i) the public debt defined in terms of revenues, debt service costs of GDP (stock indicators of fiscal performance); and/or, ii) flow indicators of fiscal performance (public deficits, primary public deficits, total revenue, total expenditure or specific spending categories) at various levels of government. In some cases a termed "golden rule" (in which investment spending is excluded) is used to prevent crowding out much-needed public investment. 9 These numerical fiscal rules may also include borrowing rules (e.g., prohibition of central bank financing). Potential disadvantages of numerical fiscal rules include lack of flexibility in fiscal policy, procyclical biases in some cases, 10 and incentives to rely on low quality measures to meet the targets. They can even foster the adoption of practices to circumvent numerical rules (reclassification of expenditures from current to capital items, using off-budget public entities to perform government operations, using debt instruments not covered in debt limits, creative accounting, etc.).
11
The second type of fiscal rules (with mainly a character of allowing fiscal policy to respond acyclically or countercyclically to changing macroeconomic circumstances) is based on: i) a balanced budget requirement specified in a multiyear or medium-term context public deficit over the cycle; or on, ii) numerical targets for the structural or cyclically-adjusted balance for each year (taking into account cyclical variables critical to the public deficit such as GDP and/or prices of key commodities or, put it in a different way, to distinguish the part due to changes in the environment and the part due to changes in policy). But the definition of a medium-term objective includes the temptation to take some leeway in the short term and count on correction at the end of the cycle. In the second case, structural balances, 12 it raises a number of analytical issues as it is key to have a reliable indicator of the cyclical position of the economy (output gap), the equilibrium price of some commodities and the extent to which individual budgetary items react to fluctuations in output (budgetary elasticities) and commodity prices. For example, if output grows fast and is attributed to structural increases, the rule would imply that spending should be increased permanently. However, should the output increase be reversed, the government would be stuck with higher, difficult to reverse expenditure outlays. This suggests that government should be conservative in estimates of structural growth and revenue and may require depositing contingency reserves in a stabilisation fund, generated from fiscal surpluses during economic booms, and allow 8. With a procyclical fiscal policy, budget deficits are asymmetric across the business cycle rising during recessions but not falling as much during booms. Thus averaged over the business cycle the budget deficit will be higher. As a consequence, public debt levels experience a ratchet effect. 9. See Carranza et al. (2011) for an analysis regarding public infrastructure investment and fiscal frameworks. In any case all capital expenditure is not necessarily productive and there are items such as health care and education expenditure than could raise potential growth even more. 10. With expenditure ceilings, procyclicality can arise from the revenue side (during boom periods, governments might be tempted to cut taxes or increase tax expenditures). And as these rules set ceilings, not floors, for public expenditure, do not necessarily avoid procyclicality during downturns.
See Milesi-Ferretti (2004).
12. In addition, with a structural or cyclically adjusted balance type of rule, while interest payments is the only expenditure item not directly under the control of policy makers, excluding them from the rule weakens the link to debt sustainability. Similarly, "golden rules" are less linked to debt.
withdrawals to finance deficits during recessions. But the creation of these stabilisation funds requires not only distinguish transitory from permanent price shocks, but also to lay down rules for a transparent administration.
There are, therefore, significant trade-offs between the two main types of fiscal rules.
Firstly, the objective of transparency and simplicity argues for the choice of fiscal rules that are simple and easily monitored (those based on numerical targets for the overall budget balance, the public expenditure or the gross public debt). Nonetheless, such rules do not provide adequate flexibility to accommodate large unexpected shocks nor may they help avoid procyclicality of budgetary policies. In addition, in the case of expenditure rules, they should be complemented by balance -or debt -based rules in order to ensure debt sustainability.
On the other hand, cyclically adjusted fiscal balances are regularly used by international organizations and national institutions, but budgetary targets are seldom framed in cyclically adjusted terms. This reflects in part the relative complexity of the techniques used for the estimation of output gaps, long term commodity prices, and budgetary elasticities. 13 , 14 Moreover, as time passes subsequent computation of structural measures for a given period can give different results as revisions are made to past data. 15 The above problems are more important in emerging market countries as shocks to trend growth are the primary source of fluctuations in emerging markets, thus blurring the simple distinction between trend and cycle (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007 higher government stability, a higher per capita GDP, a lower dependency ratio and countercyclical government spending raise the likelihood of adopting a fiscal rule. Additionally, such rules can contribute to stability and growth only if they are properly designed and they take into account country-specific historical, cultural, political, and economic conditions (nonrenewable resource endowment, fiscal decentralisation, and other structural characteristics).
Moreover, the political and social acceptability of a fiscal rule is also likely to be enhanced if they are included in fiscal responsibility laws. These laws extend the concept to rules of procedure that govern the fiscal policy-making process (procedures rules with a view to establishing good practices and raising predictability) and transparency rules that determine what fiscal information has to be made public and provide accountability mechanisms. Nonetheless, in this survey we will not use such broader definition of fiscal rules and we will focus on numerical rules, not procedural or transparency ones.
The political costs of breaching the rule will also increase if an impartial body (an independent fiscal watchdog) is charged with overseeing its implementation (rather than making decisions) as it significantly reduces the risks of politically motivated manipulations of the rule.
This is especially the case with rules like structural balance based ones, which involve complex and technically demanding calculations. Therefore, fiscal councils work as complements, rather than substitutes, to fiscal rules. In any case, even independent experts are susceptible to the bias of overestimating or underestimating potential growth or commodity prices. Country experiences with fiscal rules in Latin America
In this Section we review the experiences with fiscal rules in seven Latin American countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
Argentina
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The first fiscal responsibility law in Argentina (Ley Nº 2.152 de Administración de los Recursos Públicos) was passed in 1999 and it became known to the public as the "fiscal convertibility law". Following the impact of the Russian crisis and the Brazilian devaluation, Argentina was in recession, deflationary pressures were becoming more and more evident, and concern about the sustainability of the public accounts was spreading within and beyond the country.
The strength of the convertibility system was called into question and the fiscal situation was seen as one of its weakest links. With an economy that had stopped growing and financing difficult to obtain, the government had to provide an assurance that it would adjust the SNGs were not covered by the law, despite being responsible for a large share of the consolidated fiscal deficit. The Fiscal Countercyclical Fund was set up, but it never had the resources to operate in the way it was designed to.
As a matter of fact, in the second half of 2001 (months before the political and economic crisis), the authorities tried to implement an extreme fiscal rule, far more ambitious in scope than the unenforced Law Nº 25,152. It was known publicly as the "zero deficit law"
and formally enacted by a reform to financial administration Law Nº 24,156. It was meant to apply a very simple principle: monthly expenditure could not be higher than current public revenues. Although very simple, the law proved to be wholly impracticable. In fact, when the convertibility system collapsed, it was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice. 19. Except for periods of negative nominal GDP growth when nominal primary spending at most can stay constant. 20. In those cases which exceed the limit, five-year plans that tend to locate within the parameters have to be designed.
was designed to resolve the most critical aspects of the situation. 21 The debts of the provinces were assumed by the national government by means of a debt swap which converted foreign currency debts into peso-denominated debts at an exchange rate of 1.4
Argentine pesos per dollar. The new debt of the provinces to the national government had a lower net present value, a longer repayment period (16 years), a 3-year grace period and a lower real interest rate (2%). In return for financial assistance from the federal government, some administrations in the greatest fiscal and financial difficulties undertook bilateral agreements with the centre known as ordered financing programs (PFOs) to reduce their imbalances and to not increase their borrowings. As collateral of the loans, the provinces agreed to transfer their rights over federal revenue-sharing resources to the national government. The agreements included penalties for non-compliance by the provinces.
The PFOs strongly influenced the contents of the Law Nº 25,917, which became a means to give greater institutional backing to these bilateral financing agreements between the national government and the provinces. This law followed a bottom-up approach for subnational finances but was adopted by most of the provinces (21 out of 24). The fiscal rules share with the PFOs the goal of capping the provinces' public debt, and contain similar penalties for non-compliance. But these penalties are rather vague and leave their specification to the internal charter of a fiscal watchdog (Consejo Federal de Responsabilidad Fiscal), which was created to oversee and coordinate the application of the law. Its members are representatives of the national and provincial governments and it is empowered to impose penalties for non-compliance that ranges from public disclosure of any breaches to the partial withholding of budgetary transfers from the centre (other than revenue-sharing resources), although the federal government has the power to veto any penalty. Also in the interests of fiscal transparency, this law established an obligation to prepare and publish standardized multiyear budgetary information for the national government and provinces. Each year, the national government was obliged to present a macrofiscal framework that would be used as an input for preparing the budget in all administrative districts.
Regarding the record of the new law, Argentina improved significantly its fiscal accounts in recent years as public revenues grew along with economic activity. 22 However, as seen in Table 2 
Brazil
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Fiscal results in Brazil showed a significant deterioration after the Plan Real was adopted in 1994. This deterioration in fiscal performance was somewhat expected, since the drop in inflation meant the end of an important stabilizing factor for a balanced budget. The significant increase in discretionary spending and the increase in interest payments, resulting from high interest rates set by the central bank to maintain the strength of the exchange rate, also contributed to this deteriorating public finances. All these elements led to a significant expansion of the funding needs of the public sector and increased public debt, which was also increased by the cost of bank restructuring plans.
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A broad effort to improve Brazilian public finances began in the mid 1990s. In particular, a subnational debt restructuring program was launched in 1997. 26 As a result, the federal government entered into bilateral contracts with most states which included a program of fiscal adjustment and debt reduction in exchange for help with unsustainable subnational debt. 27 The contracts/programs proved to be key not only to achieve subnational fiscal consolidation (25 out of 27 signed the rescheduling agreement), 28 but also as an effective tool for fiscal coordination in the federation.
In 1998, Brazil adopted a Fiscal Stabilisation Program and reached an agreement with the IMF that sought to increase the primary surplus of federal and subnational entities (heavily based on tax increases), restructure debt, reform the budget process and promote a reform of the administration and social security. The adoption of a fiscal responsibility law in
(Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal e Finanças Publicas Municipais)
29 was a key milestone.
Being a complementary law (almost constitutional level), it requires a qualified majority (twothirds) for approval and modification, and it is binding for all entities of the public sector at all levels of government. It introduces the use of fiscal targets (primary surplus) and spending/debt limits. It does not specify quantitative targets or limits for all items, but requires that they are specified in separate legislation and regulations. Among them:
• The target is defined in terms of the primary balance, 30 is expressed in levels in the annual Law on Budget Directives and is binding for the first year (although parliament can change it during the year). It must also include projections for the budget balance, expenditure and debt for the two following years and a description of fiscal risks with an assessment of contingent fiscal liabilities.
• The ratio of net public debt-to-net revenues cannot exceed 3.5 for the federal government, 2 for states and 1.2 for municipalities.
• There are also specific limits on new spending and borrowing in the last year of a government.
• There are maximum limits on personnel expenditure, as a proportion of net current revenues (federal: 50%, states: 60% and municipalities: 60%) and include both active and retired public servants.
• Any new permanent expenditure has to be "affordable": it cannot be created without reducing other expenditure or introducing new taxes.
• The law strengthens the institutional fiscal framework of all areas of budget preparation, implementation and reporting (2-monthly, 4-monthly, annual).
The law puts strong emphasis on procedural and transparency rules. It also includes procedures to monitor implementation of targets, corrective measures to be taken in case of any breaches and respective sanctions for all levels of government (including institutional and personal sanctions -fines, dismissal, prohibition to run for elections and even jail). 31 The law 28. The Federal Government assumed the state debts and refinanced it in 30 years with fixed 6% real interest rate. Each state was committed to a monthly payment up to an amount equivalent to 13 percent of its net revenue. If the amount due exceeded this limit, the difference is capitalized to the debt stock. It was the first time that the bailout was followed by an explicit obligation on the part of the states to commit themselves to an agreed-upon fiscal adjustment program, including a declining path for the state debt. 29. The Brazilian experience is also valuable for the public consultation process that spanned to a high degree of consensus. 30. The primary balance target was chosen at a time when securities paying floating interest rates and indexed to the exchange rate represented the bulk of traded public debt and, therefore, the debt-to-GDP ratio was extremely sensitive to these variables.
The Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal e Finanças Publicas
Municipais is supported by a Fiscal Crime Law.
includes flexibility clauses which are triggered by a significant deceleration in economic activity 32 or a natural disaster but can only be invoked with Congressional approval.
The law also places a series of restrictions on relations between public agencies and levels of government to prevent bail-outs, monetization of deficits, and misuses of public financial institutions. In particular, it prohibits any new credit arrangement between entities of the public sector, as well as the direct deficit financing of any kind by the Central Bank.
Furthermore, state-owned financial institutions are prohibited to lend any money to their controlling agency. Despite provisions in the law, no institution is mandated to provide an independent view on the government's proposed fiscal framework, policies, and macroeconomic assumptions. 32. Negative or economic growth below 1% in the previous four quarters, and natural disasters let governments have a longer period to adjust to limits imposed by the law but can only be invoked with Congressional approval.
The international financial crisis in 2008-09 put the fiscal framework to the test and Brazil was able to adopt countercyclical fiscal policy apart from the full operation of automatic stabilisers (mainly through temporary and targeted tax cuts and a reduction of the primary fiscal balance target). In addition, the government also started to give loans to public banks, which have been recorded as transactions in financial assets with no impact on the fiscal target (quasi-fiscal operations). While the fiscal response to the crisis was effective, there was a weakening of fiscal transparency and the credibility of the fiscal framework may have suffered (uncertainty about the use of the investment adjustor, the exclusion of ad hoc expenditures or about how to account for sizeable policy lending).
Chile
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The adoption of a structural budget balance-based rule was announced in May 2000 by President Lagos, following intense technical preparations in the early months of his mandate.
Chile's fiscal rule seeks to insulate expenditure from cyclical fluctuations of real GDP growth and key mineral export prices. The adoption came at the end of a long period during which the public debt was reduced from 165% in 1985 to 20% of GDP in 2000 and with the intention of solidifying and codifying the emerging fiscal discipline. The institutional coverage applied in the construction of the structural balance (not the primary structural balance) is the Central Government (excluding public enterprises, municipalities and public universities).
In summary, the fiscal rule follows three steps. First Table 4 ).
The rule requires only that fiscal policy be acyclical 37 to be activated by a predetermined negative output gap and would be subject to two constraints: i) take the form of nonpermanent expenditure changes and/or temporary tax adjustments easily reversible; and, ii) a ceiling of 0.5% of GDP per annum.
• Escape clauses: Target compliance can be temporarily suspended in the event of a significant shock (natural catastrophes, military conflicts or major economic crisis). Post-crisis convergence to the target is to be gradual, but it should not exceed three years in order to maintain intertemporal fiscal strength.
• Primary spending should be the basis for the fiscal rule. This would insulate the cyclically adjusted balance from interest rate changes and procyclical bias of revenue coming from rule-based asset accumulation (return on accrued financial assets may not be in line with the long-term interest rates).
• Copper price smoothing: The impact of sharp changes in the estimated long term copper price on cyclically adjusted revenue and, therefore, on spending should be smoothened by either adjusting the fiscal target or estimating its trend price.
• Ex post target compliance: midyear monitoring and correction of cyclically adjusted balance deviations from its target. This requirement would be mandated by law.
• Exclusion of transitory fiscal provisions. The cyclically adjusted balance would exclude the impact of temporary fiscal measures such as tax hikes or reductions. This would prevent financing permanent spending with transitory revenue.
• Elimination of the cyclical correction on the return on accrued financial assets.
• Establishment of an independent fiscal council to evaluate the fiscal rule methodology, provide assumptions and projections for variables required to calculate the cyclical adjustment, assess medium-term and long-term sustainability, evaluate cases when exit clauses are invoked, etc.
See Caballero et al. (2011).
After incorporating the recommendations on the methodology of estimating the structural balance presented by the advisory committee in its report, there was a reassessment of the results of structural balance which are shown in Table 4 . Given these changes, the structural deficit as a percentage of GDP for 2009 was re-estimated from 1.1% to 3%. Additionally, after the earthquake and tsunami of February 2010, the Piñera administration approved a package of temporary and permanent increases in taxes and spending reallocations to finance the substantial cost of reconstruction (4.2% of GDP) and announced that it could not commit to restoring the structural balance by the end of its time in office. As a consequence, the new government proposed a goal of convergence of the structural deficit to 1% of GDP in 2014, reducing the structural deficit each year.
Colombia
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The Colombian 1991 Constitution states that the country is a state organized in the form of a single, decentralized Republic with autonomous subnational divisions. The Nation is required to transfer funds to SNGs to finance education, health, potable water and other general purpose services. These funds are very rigid and cannot be used to cover any debt. Another important transfer comes from the royalties from the extraction of nonrenewable resources. Apart from it, SNGs are free to regulate taxes tied to consumption, property taxes and fines and penalties.
Colombia's early fiscal rules were applicable only to SNGs and aimed to strengthen 
where b is primary fiscal balance, b * is the targeted structural primary balance (primary balance adjusted for economic, commodity cycles and extraordinary items); y is the output gap (as a % of potencial GDP) and ccip represents the excess oil revenues (from either higher 43.The reform on royalties (articles 360 and 361 of the Constitution) means that resources from that source will focus on science and technology, retirement savings, regional development projects, physical investments in education and public savings. The administration of such resources will be carried out by territorial entities and will be overseen by the central government.
44. Rulemaking of various matters is still pending, including the definition of structural deficit, counter-cyclical expenditure, and exceptions to compliance to the fiscal rule. 45. The authorities opted for a fiscal rule focused on the central government on the grounds that it was preferable to define targets on variables that were under the direct control of the government in spite of the fact that if the fiscal rule had covered the consolidated public sector the overall debt target had been better anchored.
than expected oil prices or production above a determined baseline) generated by Ecopetrol, 
Mexico
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The 46. Countercyclical fiscal stimulus is permitted if the projected growth rate falls at least two percentage points below the long-term growth rate and the output gap is negative. The fiscal stimulus has to be below 20% of the estimated negative output gap and will be transitory as it has to be dismantled completely over a period of two years, with a requirement that in the first year of that period the economy should register an economic growth rate equal to or greater than its real economic growth in the long run. It has to be subject to the favorable opinion of CONFIS (an internal fiscal council headed by the Finance Minister).
The main source is IMF (2010b).
where G = public sector expenditure; T = public sector revenue; P * = oil price parameter in the budget which for each year is projected using a reference oil price, with a weight of ¾ being given to oil futures prices and a weight of ¼ to the average oil price of the last 10 years;
and, Y * = expected output. So that when extra revenues (ER) are observed (from oil prices being higher than the reference price and/or observed output being higher than expected output), The Mexican a priori balanced budget rule is pro-cyclical as it implies high public spending when economic activity and revenues are buoyant, and spending restraint when economic activity and revenues are weak. Many analysts also suggest that the government should consider accumulating a buffer of financial assets not only during economic upturns but over the business cycles as a whole to reduce this cyclical vulnerability of the public finances and increase the authorities' capacity to counter the impacts of negative shocks on public revenues. Additionally, the balance budget is done on a year-by-year basis and lacks a broader medium term outlook of three to five years.
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Apart from these needs, the Mexican sustainability of fiscal policy faces two major structural problems: (i) the decline in oil production which has been offset by the significant increase in oil prices; and, (ii) the low rate of non-oil taxation as the domestic tax burden is well below that of countries at similar levels of development. annual debt service to current income must be below 25 percent; and, iii) the moving average of the primary outcome of three years must show a positive value for each regional and local governments. The fiscal rule also provides that failure of fiscal rules in the regional and local governments restrict access to intergovernmental funds 54 and that the government through Emergency Decree can adopt fiscal measures aimed at stabilizing public finances of these entities. SNGs need the central government's guarantee to contract external debt, which must be allocated to finance infrastructure.
However, there have been high and increasing rates of non-compliance at the subnational level and no SNG has received sanctions. This is probably due to the fact that the subnational public finances in Peru never deteriorated to the point where it adversely affected the country's financial sector or macroeconomic stability.
Further changes in the Ley Nº 27.958 were: i) the cap to the increase in real nonfinancial expenditures of the general government was raised from 2% to 3%; ii) the Regarding the assessment of the fiscal rule, as seen in Table 7 expenditure increased by more than 35% in both years. In fact, the Peruvian fiscal rule that combines deficit and current expenditure ceilings seems to be well suited to favour public infrastructure investment, key to close the significant infrastructure gaps of the region (see Carranza et al., 2011) . There were, however, low execution rates of capital spending as they are mainly made at the subnational level.
The fiscal rule also created a fiscal stabilisation fund to mitigate cyclical variations.
The Fondo de Estabilización Fiscal (FEF) accumulates income from the fiscal surplus at the end of the year (if current income from ordinary resources exceeded its three previous year's 55. Thus, investment spending and expenditure of the local and regional governments were excluded from the spending rule. 56. Changes include not only the use of different deflators and targets for real growth rates, but also the transactional coverage to use the cap (from current spending to consumption expenditure). 57. Similarly, a sound debt management strategy successfully reduced debt vulnerabilities in terms of currency and interest rate risks.
average in 0.3% of GDP), 10% of net income from each sale of assets for privatization, 10%
of down payments by state concessions and 30% of funds raised by new royalties for the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources owned by the state, in addition to interest from deposits in the FEF. The stabilisation fund may not exceed 4% of GDP. The resources exceeding this limit will be used for debt reduction or will go to the Fondo Consolidado de
Reservas Previsionales. FEF resources may only be used when revenues are at least 0.3 percent of GDP lower than the average ratio of the last 3 years and GDP declines in two consecutive quarters. However, no more than 40 percent of total funds can be used in a given year, except when the escape clauses apply. At the end of 2009 it had accumulated 1.4% of GDP and it was not used during the financial crisis because discretion regarding the timing of inflows to the FEF allowed the government to apply the 2008 surplus to the stimulus.
On 31 March Emergency Decree Nº 012-2011 was passed to achieve the objective of increasing the FEF, which amounted to $5.63 billion (3.2% of GDP) at the end of 2011. surged. Therefore, rules about this fund were frequently changed, ignored, or the operation of the fund was temporarily suspended. In fact, the oil fund mostly integrated with overall fiscal policy. Even at times, the required deposits could only be made in the fund by taking on public debt. It is not strange that according to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2010), the Venezuelan FEM was given a very negative grade in terms of transparency (just 1 out of 10).
Venezuela
In summary, the organic budget law and the FIEM/FEM were put in place with the objective of improving fiscal performance and smoothing expenditure. Nonetheless, they did not achieve this purpose as they did not prevent the implementation of highly procyclical fiscal policies. During the boom and in a situation of abundant liquidity generated by resource revenues, a number of rules targeting the non-resource balance and the rate of growth of expenditure were tested by mounting expenditure pressures. These pressures may have been based in part on growing perceptions as time went by that the resource price increases were "permanent." As a result, the rules were not implemented.
Assessment of fiscal rules in Latin America
The role of numerical fiscal rules and stabilisation funds in both short run stabilisation and the promotion of longer term sustainability have gained increased emphasis in policy and academic debates. In theory, well designed and effectively implemented fiscal rules, although second best policies, can help reduce time inconsistency in budgetary policies, strengthen the credibility of a government's commitment to fiscal sustainability, and facilitate countercyclical fiscal management. However, these effects are difficult to test empirically. The rules and funds have been in place for just a few years and there could be some problems, related to identification (a potential omitted variable is the political commitment to fiscal discipline) and reverse causality (fiscal rules could be adopted to "lock in" gains from Several econometric studies have found that the existence of fiscal rules is correlated with a stronger fiscal performance. Manasse (2006) , in a sample of 49 countries, modeled the effect of fiscal rules as a dummy variable to explain the primary deficit and found that fiscal policy is weakly procyclical and that the presence of a fiscal rule makes it more countercyclical. But it is difficult to establish causality due to an endogeneity bias (once the quality of institutions is accounted for it could be the case that fiscal rules do not significantly affect policy): 59 it is more likely that virtuous countries/governments put in place fiscal frameworks that are conducive to fiscal sustainability and to a correct policy response to the cycle, rather than being such frameworks that make countries/governments more virtuous. With respect to the aim of strengthening the long term sustainability (reducing the deficit bias and controlling the growth in public debt) in Latin America, Daude et al. (2011) found that sustainability had recently improved (all the countries except Argentina were able during the last decade to exhibit fiscal balances above those required to sustain their current debt levels), although they did not explicitly attributed it to the fiscal frameworks.
See Frankel et al. (2011).
60. They find that fiscal rules may have helped anchor efforts to strengthen fiscal policy, but do not seem to have been the driver of such efforts. There are nine countries in their sample. Five of them (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) are from Latin America. 61. The empirical approach relies on "differences-in-differences" estimation and assumes an arbitrary "treatment date" for the control group in the sample. As discussed in this paper, the correct selection of break dates is critical to avoid estimation bias. Emerging market economies that did not adopt fiscal rules also experienced improvements in their fiscal performance around the same time as the economies which adopted them.
Regarding the short term stabilisation aim, IMF (2011a) points out that after adopting the rules, fiscal policy was broadly procyclical as real expenditures expanded well above the rate of potential economic growth. A different and more common way to measure the fiscal stance is through the fiscal impulse, defined as the change in the structural primary balance. 62 In Figure 1 65. Commodity prices can be claimed to be invariant with respect to policy response in individual commodity-producers in the sample, which ensures that the empirical analysis is free from double-causality problems. This is a great advantage over much of the previous literature that examines procyclicality with respect to the GDP, which are unquestionably not invariant with respect to domestic policy.
reasons for this was the popular resentment that the government had resisted intense pressure to spend the soaring receipts from copper exports which had been mostly saved.
However, since mid-2009, Bachelet attained a very high approval rating which kept through the remainder of the term. The change took place in a period when the global recession hit the Chilean economy (the economy contracted 1.5% in 2009 and unemployment increased to its highest level in 5 years, 10%). But the government increased spending sharply, using the assets that it had acquired during the copper boom, and thereby moderated the downturn. As stated by Frankel (2011a) : "…saving for a rainy day made the officials heroes when that rainy day comes, but it is very difficult to be a hero in sunny days…".
Additionally, calculating the business cycle and the commodity cycle is not straightforward. And it is very relevant for the application of rules based on structural balances. There is a great degree of uncertainty concerning output gap estimates in Latin America as the trends for potential output are compounded with highly volatile cyclical shocks. The volatile, uncertain, and exhaustible resource revenues also pose significant challenges to fiscal management as it is not easy to distinguish their transitory and permanent components (see Baunsgaard et al., 2012) . It is a well-known fact that commodity prices are highly persistent and it is hard to reject the hypothesis that they follow a "random walk", i.e., that expected tomorrow's price is equal to today's price. Moreover, high commodity prices tend to coincide with low interest rates, which make borrowing more attractive, especially for economies that are net debtors, as most Latin American countries are. Thus, this has led in the past to spending in excess due to the price-rise.
At the same time, the institutional coverage of rules depends on the degree of fiscal decentralisation and autonomy of various levels of government (Chile is a relatively centralized fiscal system, in Mexico and Peru decentralisation is growing and Argentina, Brazil and
Colombia have more autonomy). Even in the case of decentralized systems there are topdown systems (Brazil, Colombia, Peru) or cases like Argentina, in which, the federal government passed the law only for itself, and this set the framework, incentive, or example for the sub-national governments to have their own fiscal rules voluntarily. Therefore, sub-national governments are starting off from different levels of development and of mandates of expenditures. And fiscal rules cannot substitute for well-designed systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations because introducing hard constraints at the regional level can adversely affect the quality of public services. Unfortunately, most countries in the region lack formal forums for policy dialogue across government levels, the formulation of subnational budgets is often carried out without timely inputs by the central government, and reporting by the regions on their budget execution is subject to long delays and based on different accounting rules.
Additionally, in cases where sub-national governments have accumulated a large stock of debt, as in Argentina or Brazil, a fiscal rule has gone hand in hand with a debt rescheduling program with the national government.
In any case, for the first time in recent decades most countries in the region were able to avoid a procyclical fiscal response to a negative shock (the 2008-09 global financial crisis). 66 But another shortcoming of the fiscal rules in Latin America is related to its behaviour during the recent global crisis (in the presence of low growth or of external shocks affecting commodity prices), as most rules were modified, incorporating escape clauses to limit the application of numerical rules or to suspend them following ad hoc procedures because there was little room to adjust to shocks. This should only apply in ex ante predefined circumstances, be well designed from the start, and require objective analysis and scrutiny to invoke their application (including voting rules) to ensure that credibility in the fiscal rule is not undermined as shown by the negative experience in Peru's earlier versions of the fiscal rule. It should also specify the path back to the rule and the treatment of accumulated deviations.
In most countries fiscal councils, i.e. institutions with a specific mandate to assess and monitor the implementation and impacts of fiscal policy, do not exist or are institutionally weak. Their advice is not binding, critical fiscal policy analysis is almost inexistent 67 and budgetary accountability and ex-post evaluation is not substantive. Only in Chile an independent body sets budget assumptions and methodologies (for the calculation of potential GDP and reference commodity prices) which are key inputs into the implementation of rules. Therefore, a second generation of fiscal rules in Latin America should also give a more prominent role to independent fiscal agencies in their part as complement to fiscal rules in order to deal with the informational asymmetries between voters (the principal in the policy game) and politicians (see Debrun, Gérard, and Harris, 2012) and to reduce the overoptimism of governments' budget forecasts, especially during booms (see Frankel, 2011b) .
66. Headline fiscal balances fell abruptly, whereas structural fiscal balances fell moderately. 67. Multi-year macroeconomic projections of revenue, expenditure, public investment, and public debt are undertaken within the Ministries of Economy and Finance, which are also the actors charged with designing and implementing the fiscal policies. Thus, there is room for further strengthening of external formal checks-and-balances.
Concluding remarks
A sound design of fiscal rules and their effective implementation and enforcement is challenging, since fiscal rules: i) limit the flexibility of policymakers to respond to different economic and political challenges, especially in countries with small automatic stabilisers; ii) change the balance of power between political actors; iii) involve significant trade-offs among different policy objectives; and, iv) have to be tailored to the specific economic and institutional characteristics of each country. The state of a country's financial system also matters for the decision to adopt a fiscal rule, and for its design: if the financial system is in a precarious state, and likely to require significant government bailouts, a debt rule may quickly become untenable. As seen in the previous sections, there is a wide variety of fiscal rules in Latin America and their targets differ across countries. For example, rules on budget balance are subject to variations: overall balance, current balance (or golden rule, so as to avoid the crowding-out of much-needed public investment). In some countries, the budget balance rule is accompanied by additional limits on total government expenditures, or the fastest growing components of fiscal expenditure: primary (non-interest) outlays, interest payments, and/or the wage bill. In other countries less procyclical but more demanding information and institutional design rules have been adopted.
Institutional coverage depends on the degree of decentralisation of the fiscal systems in the different countries; however, in light of experience, trusting market-based approaches to control sub-national borrowing is not advisable, and there is scope for enforceable subnational fiscal rules.
Fiscal rules in Latin America (perhaps with the exceptions of Brazil and Chile) generally made a poor start and were repeatedly modified after first being adopted, amid fiscal performance slippages. This survey has studied whether they have served two main objectives: fiscal sustainability and the capacity to respond to shocks. It shows that the former objective has been better served. 68 The survey has also offered some suggestions to improve fiscal rule frameworks (better accounting for economic shocks). In any case, although fiscal rules can help, they are neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve fiscal discipline. Indeed, fiscal rules can be regarded as a formal expression of the political will to maintain fiscal discipline: a rulesbased fiscal policy without the political will to enforce will fail.
68. Other concerns regarding the functioning of fiscal rules are the risks of distracting from spending priorities, or undermining transparency due to incentives for creative accounting (IMF, 2009b).
